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Over the last half century, the saving rate in the United States exhibited signi¯cant medium-
run variations. In this paper, I examine whether a general equilibrium model that allows for
shifts in the rate of total factor productivity growth rate can account for these variations. The
model matches the medium-run variations in the U.S. saving rate, and establishes a link between
episodes of productivity slowdowns or accelerations and the saving rate|two concepts that have
often been treated in isolation. I also use population projections and productivity forecasts to
chart the future of the U.S. saving rate. Finally, I consider an extended version of the model,
which treats housing as an input into the production of non-market goods, and explore the
quantitative in°uence of housing on the consumption{income ratio.
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Over the last quarter century, the growth rate of consumption in the U.S. has far outstripped the
growth rate of its GDP. Figure 1 shows personal consumption expenditures as a percentage of
GDP since 1952. Both the actual and Hodrick-Prescott ¯ltered series exhibit an upward trend,
especially after the 1970s. A more familiar restatement of this trend is the declining personal
saving rate in the U.S. In this paper I argue that medium-run swings in the productivity growth
rate help account for this rising consumption-to-income ratio.
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In this paper, I examine whether a general equilibrium model, which allows for shifts in the
rate of productivity growth rate, can account for these variations. I ¯nd that the model matches
the broader medium-run variations in the U.S. consumption{income ratio, and establishes a link
between episodes of productivity slowdowns or accelerations and the saving rate|two concepts
that have often been treated in isolation.
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I also ¯nd that the rate of return to capital over the last 50 years has not been constant,
and that the model tracks the changes reasonably well. As such, these ¯ndings provide support
for the intertemporal substitution motive|a core classical theme in macroeconomics|as a key
driver of the medium-run swings in the observed consumption-to-income ratio in the U.S.
More recently, with the run-up and subsequent collapse in housing prices, the (\low") sav-
ing rate in the U.S. has become a focal point of economic policy debates. Within this con-
text, housing poses conceptual challenges, and raises measurement issues. From a measurement
standpoint, conventional national income accounting treats housing (imputed rent) as a ¯nal
personal consumption expenditure. In this paper I exclude housing from consumption expen-
ditures. Instead, in an extension of the baseline model, I model housing as an input into the
production of non-market goods, and explore quantitatively the indirect in°uence of housing
on the consumption{income ratio. Overall, relative to the baseline model without housing, the
extended model matches the actual data better, but the extended model still fails to account
for the persistently high consumption{income ratio in the 2000s.
1In the quantitative sections of this paper I focus on the ratio of personal consumption expenditures to market
income, which excludes gross housing value added as reported in the national income and product accounts
(NIPA), and consider a closed economy. In an appendix available from the author, I discuss a range of alternative
expressions of the consumption-income ratio that di®er in terms of their treatment of the foreign and government
sectors, and durable goods. In all these cases, I document a marked increase in the consumption-to-income ratio
at least since the early 1980s. So, the di®erences across business, foreign, government, and personal savings are
not driving the trend shown in Figure 1. See also Parker (2000) for an extensive discussion.
2For instance, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics data, the business sector multifactor productivity
growth rate was 2.77 percent during the period 1952{1973 (\Golden Age"), 0.82 percent between 1973{1995
("slowdown"), and 2.09 percent between 1995{2006 (\resurgence").
1Figure 1: Personal consumption expenditures as a percentage of GDP, United States, 1952{2006
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Notes: The solid line is the actual data and the dashed line is the Hodrick-Prescott ¯ltered data with the smoothing
parameter set equal to 100.
Along a balanced growth path, the time paths of consumption and income are typically de-
termined by a unique long-run growth rate of the productivity factor, and both consumption
and income grow at constant rates. Moreover, since the consumption-income ratio is bounded
between zero and one, they must also grow at identical rates. Hence, in a deterministic neo-
classical growth model, the consumption-income ratio is constant.
3 This paper, on the other
hand, accounts for the rising consumption-income ratio by appealing to shifts (or \waves") in the
growth rate of total factor productivity, of the nature identi¯ed by Gordon (2004), among others.
I also consider the distinction between perceived and actual long-run productivity growth rate.
I compare the consumption{income ratios based on real-time forecasts of productivity growth
with those based on currently available revised data, and ¯nd signi¯cant di®erences.
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3In quantitative implementations, such a ratio is sometimes called a \calibration target." When the economy
is approaching to its balanced-growth path, the consumption-income ratio need not be constant.
4While consumption-output ratio is an appropriate calibration \target" in general equilibrium models, partial
equilibrium permanent income and life-cycle models of consumption point to a slightly di®erent but an analogous
ratio|the ratio of personal consumption to personal wealth, which is equal to human plus non-human wealth. In
these models, households consume out of their permanent income, which is typically the annuity value of personal
wealth, and thus target a long-run consumption-wealth ratio (see Merton, 1969; Campbell and Mankiw, 1989;
Deaton, 1992, chapter 3; Carroll, 2001). This ratio has recently been interpreted as a long-run relationship among
2The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the existing explana-
tions for the rising consumption{income ratio in the U.S. Section 3 presents a baseline growth
model. Section 4 presents the simulation results for the baseline model, and discusses the
quantitative signi¯cance of medium-run swings in productivity growth rate as a key driver of
the consumption{income ratio. It also presents results from several extensions of the baseline
model, including a model in which home production uses housing capital. Section 5 contains
concluding remarks. A technical appendix and a data appendix complement the paper.
2 Existing explanations
In the recent literature, most of the attention has focused on ¯ve possible complementary expla-
nations of rising consumption{income ratio: capital gains, ¯nancial innovations, demographic
transition, cohort e®ects, and low interest rates. There is, at best, mixed evidence on the quan-
titative signi¯cance of each of these sources in accounting for the decline in the saving rate. In
what follows I review each of these explanations and the evidence. (See Parker (2000) for a
survey.)
Capital gains.|According to this explanation households have perceived the capital gains in
booming stock and housing markets recorded since the mid-1990s as permanent (which is the
component of changes in wealth that matters the most for consumption decisions), and this
wealth e®ect has culminated in a higher consumption{income ratio (Congressional Budget Of-
¯ce, 2006; Council of Economic Advisors, 2006; Steindel, 2007). One practical di±culty with
the capital gains explanation is the large uncertainty concerning the permanent component of
changes in asset prices. The consensus view in the literature (e.g., Lettau and Ludvigson, 2004)
suggests that even sizeable variations in non-human wealth typically lead to small changes in
consumption, because shocks to wealth have a large transitory component. So, for this channel
to account for the increase in the consumption{income ratio, households must have imputed a
large permanent component to run-ups in equity and housing prices between 1995 and 2006.
5
Another di±culty with the capital gains explanation is its timing: the decline in the saving
rate started before the run-up in asset prices.
6 Moreover, the rise in the consumption{income
consumption expenditures, after-tax labor income and household net worth (Lettau and Ludvigson, 2004).
5Recent studies also suggest that, over the last 45 years, consumption{wealth ratio in the U.S. has gone through
fundamental structural changes, which makes it di±cult to ascertain the permanent component of changes in
wealth. See Koop et al. (2005), Hang and Lee (2006), Rudd and Whalen (2006), and Alexandre et al. (2007).
6In fact, the evidence suggests that the wealth e®ect is more closely related to capital gains in the housing
3ratio went on unabated despite large °uctuations in asset prices and wealth-to-income ratio.
Therefore, while the capital gains channel theoretically holds the promise of accounting for rising
consumption{income ratio, available evidence poses serious challenges to this explanation.
Financial innovations.|This explanation is based on the argument that the combination of
rapid innovation and deregulation in the ¯nancial sector has allowed households to borrow
against their human wealth, facilitated annuitization of non-human wealth, and consequently
reduced precautionary savings (Carroll, 1992). These developments together with the changing
norms of consumption have lead to a rise in the consumption{income ratio (Cynamon and
Fazzari, 2008). While plausible, general equilibrium consequences of this explanation remains
largely unexplored within a quantitative framework.
7
Demographic transition and cohort e®ects.|One of the early explanations advanced for the
declining saving rate in the U.S. suggests that as the U.S. population has aged, the fraction
of the population with higher propensities to consume has increased, leading to a rise in the
aggregate consumption{income ratio. However, it is di±cult to empirically account for the
declining saving rate through demographic transition (age a®ects) alone, and in none of the
studies reviewed by Parker (2000) demographic transition stands out as a contender. On the
other hand, there is mixed evidence for cohort e®ects. Using micro level data, while Bosworth,
Burtless, and Sabelhous (1991) ¯nd that the saving rate of all age groups have declined uniformly
over time, Gokhale, Kotliko®, and Sabelhous (1996) attribute the decline in the overall saving
rate entirely to the rise in the consumption propensities of older age groups. Recently, Doepke
and Schneider (2006) document the dramatic decline in the household sector's net nominal asset
position at least since the 1990s, and attribute it to higher nominal debt held by the young and
lower nominal savings by the old.
8
Low interest rates.|This explanation attributes the rise in consumption{income ratio to the
intertemporal substitution motive.
9 In general, a higher real interest rate stimulates saving, and
market, which started around 2001, rather than to those in the stock market (Borsworth et al., 1991; Donihue
and Avramenko, 2007).
7Using a partial equilibrium framework Parker (2000, pp. 333{334) concludes that ¯nancial innovations are
unlikely to account for the large increase in the consumption{income ratio.
8Gokhale et al. (1996) attribute the declining saving propensity of the elderly to the introduction of medicare
bene¯ts, generous transfers from young to old generations, and improved annuitization facilities|a form of ¯-
nancial innovation. Doepke and Schneider (2006) also document the changes that has occurred in the duration
and composition of nominal assets since the 1980s. These are also suggestive of the consequences of ¯nancial
innovation|especially in the mortgage market|as a complementary source of falling saving rate.
9See, e.g., Parker (2000, pp. 358{362). Bosworth et al. (1991, pp. 200{201) allude to the interest rate channel.
4reduces consumption{income ratio.
Figure 2 shows the real interest rate in the U.S. since 1952 using both a benchmark bond
yield (panel a), and direct measures of rate of return to capital (panel b). The data in panel
(a) are perhaps the most commonly used measures of the real interest rate. They show the
familiar pattern that the real yields were low in the 1950s and 1960s, rose over the 1970s,
reached to their peak in 1982, and have been declining since then. Based on these data alone
one would be skeptical about the intertemporal substitution channel: compared to the period
from 1952 to 1980, the real interest rate has on average been higher since 1980, and yet the
consumption{income ratio has consistently been above that of the 1952{1980 average.
However, Figure 2 panel (b) presents a di®erent perspective on the intertemporal substitution
motive. It shows two measures of pre-tax rate of return to capital: (i) rate of return to tangible
assets in the non¯nancial corporate sector computed by Poterba (1998), and, (ii) rate of return to
¯xed assets in the corporate sector. The two series are slightly di®erent in magnitude, because
Poterba's asset de¯nition is broader and excludes the ¯nancial sector. However, they both
exhibit identical trends. Panel (b) shows that there has been a mild but discernible decline over
time in the rate of return to capital, coupled with medium-run swings.
Below I argue that the movements in the real rate of return to capital are more relevant for un-
derstanding the joint behaviour of (model-based) consumption and income variables. More im-
portantly, a satisfactory understanding of the consumption{income ratio has to consider causes,
as well as consequences of changes in the real interest rate. To capture these linkages at the
macroeconomic level, I next consider a general equilibrium setup.
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3 The model
The model I use to examine the simultaneous determination of the rate of return to capital and
the consumption{income ratio is the neoclassical growth model. I refer the reader to Gomme
and Rupert (2007) for a recent exposition of this framework in a business-cycle context. In
However, their arguments are based on a life-cycle model of consumption, in which a rise in the interest rate
reduces saving of the older generations only. While the saving rate of elderly households have declined (although
remains positive), they don't ¯nd su±ciently large di®erences in saving rates by age for the real interest rate
channel to have an appreciable e®ect on the overall saving rate. Cynamon and Fazzari (2008), on the other hand,
claim that \no wealth e®ect of increasing asset prices, no substitution e®ect of lower interest rates" could explain
the recent rise in both consumption and debt.
10In fact, in their concluding remarks Bosworth et al. (1991) note that their \result suggests that the decline
in saving must involve one or more factors that a®ect the vast majority of households uniformly. In seeking an
explanation for the drop in saving, we are thus drawn back to macroeconomic factors, rather than the demographic
and microeconomic determinants that many economists currently ¯nd so attractive."
5Figure 2: The real interest rate, U.S. 1952{2006
Notes: a) The real interest rate is calculated as BAA corporate bond yield minus expected in°ation, where
expected in°ation is either actual one-year ahead in°ation (solid line), or the in°ation forecast from Michigan
Consumer Attitudes survey (dashed line). b) The rate of return is before tax corporate pro¯ts divided by ¯xed
assets (solid line), or tangible assets (dashed line). All interest rates are annualized and percent.
Sources: a) Moody's BAA corporate bond yield from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/, CPI (for all urban consumers and all items) in°ation data are from Bureau
of Labor Statistics (series ID CPIAUCNS), and Michigan Consumer Attitudes Survey. b) Poterba (1998, Table
1, column 1), and author's calculations based on BEA data as explained in the Data Appendix.
particular, I follow their lead in constructing empirical variables that match their theoretical
counterparts as closely as possible. The most distinctive feature of the analysis is the quantitative
methodology, which is discussed in section 3.2. I now brie°y describe the baseline model without
explicit modeling of housing. In the quantitative analysis, I extend the baseline model to include
the production of home goods by means of housing as capital stock. The technical appendix A
contains a more complete treatment of the baseline model, as well as the (extended) model with
housing.
3.1 The basic environment
Households.|There is a representative household whose size N grows at a gross rate nt =
Nt=Nt¡1. (N should be thought of as the civilian non-institutional population ages 16 and over.)
Total market and non-market time available to each member of the household is normalized to
one. Each member of this household derives utility from consuming market goods, cmt, and




¯tNtu(Ct;1 ¡ ht); (1)
6where 0 < ¯ < 1 is the discount factor. The instantaneous utility function is isoelastic,




; ¾ 6= 1; (2)
where ¾ > 0 is the inverse of the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution, and ! > 0 is the
weight on leisure.
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The market capital stock evolves according to
nt+1kmt+1 = (1 ¡ ±mt)kmt + xmt; (3)
where the depreciation rate is denoted by ±m, and investment level is xm.
The rental rate on market capital is r, and the wage rate is w per unit of market hours.
Both are determined in competitive factor markets. Capital income is taxed at ¿kt.
12 There are
also transfers (or lump-sum taxes) from the government ¿t. The per capita household budget
constraint is
cmt + xmt = wthmt + (1 ¡ ¿kt)rtkmt + ¿t: (4)





where Amt is the exogenous labor-augmenting technology in the market sector. The parameter
0 < ® < 1 is the elasticity of output with respect to capital, and it is time invariant.





Government sector.| The government expenditures are equal to revenues in each period:
¿ktrtkmt = gt + ¿t; (7)
where g is government consumption expenditures per person.
Equilibrium and the steady-state solution.| The equilibrium in this model requires that goods
and labor markets clear simultaneously (again see the technical appendix). The model has a
unique steady-state solution.
11When ¾ = 1, the utility function is u(Ct;1 ¡ ht) = lnCt + ! ln(1 ¡ ht):
12The tax rate on capital income is calculated as the ratio of capital income tax to before-tax pro¯ts plus capital
consumption allowance. Thus, after-tax real interest rate is (1 ¡ ¿kt)f
0(km) ¡ ±m. Below I also allow for taxes
on labor income.
73.2 Quantitative methodology
I solve the model numerically. The quantitative methodology takes as data initial conditions
for endogenous state variables, parameter values, and exogenous variables, and then solves for
optimal values of endogenous variables.
Speci¯cally, the solution uses the following data: parameter values for ¯;®;! and ¾, which are
either calibrated by matching \calibration targets" based on steady-state values of endogenous
variables (such as ¯), or measured outside the model from actual data (such as ®); exogenous
variables gmt;nt;±mt;gt; and ¿kt, which are set to their empirical counterparts from actual data,
and the initial value of the endogenous state variable kmt. I have 55 annual observations (from
1952 to 2006) on the exogenous variables. The data appendix B discusses the sources for
parameter values and the estimated variables. The algorithm then solves for equilibrium values
of kmt;cmt, and hmt, for t = 0;:::;T.
13 Since this methodology uses the actual realizations of
exogenous variables, I am able to directly compare the model-based endogenous variables with
the actual data.
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4 The simulation results
How successful is this baseline model in matching the consumption{income ratio in the U.S.?
Figure 3 panel (a) shows the simulation results for the basic model and compares them with the
actual data|the ratio of market consumption to market income, whereby both measures exclude
gross housing value added. The ¯gure delivers three main messages. First, over much of the
period, the model-based consumption{income ratio is signi¯cantly higher than the actual ratio
in the data. The gap is especially signi¯cant at the beginning of the sample period (1952{19170).
Second, the model-based series are signi¯cantly more volatile than the data. This \excess
smoothness" of the consumption{income ratio in actual data may be due to a variety of rea-
sons. One possibility, which I pursue later on, is that the growth rates of labor-augmenting
productivity index used in these simulations do not necessarily capture the measure of long-run
13The numerical solution is a forward-iteration algorithm as described in the technical appendix A.2. I determine
the steady-state solution of the model using the sample averages of gm;n;±m;g; and ¿k as their steady-state
counterparts. In order to solve kmt;cmt, and hmt, I set T > 55 to an arbitrarily large number. I check whether
the endogenous variables converge su±ciently to their theoretical steady states. I verify this numerically by
increasing the value of T. In practice, T = 100, corresponding to 2050 in calendar time, is su±cient to attain the
convergence criterion.
14Previous studies that employ a similar quantitative methodology are Chen, _ Imrohoro¸ glu, and _ Imrohoro¸ glu
(2007), and Braun, Ikeda, and Joines (2006), both for Japan, and Cooley and Ohanian (1997), for the U.K.
8Figure 3: Simulation results for the baseline model
Notes: Consumption is personal consumption expenditures minus gross housing value added. Income is GDP
minus gross housing value added. See Appendix B for data sources and parameter values underlying the model-
based series. Model-based series are computed using a forward-iteration algorithm as explained in Appendix A.2.
Out-of-sample values of gm;n;±m; and ¿k are set equal to their sample (1952{2006) averages. The steady-state
value of hm is also set equal to its sample average.
productivity growth rate on which the households and ¯rms might have based their decisions.
Third, and the above mentioned shortcomings notwithstanding, the model-based consumption{
income series track the data remarkably well. For instance, the model-based series parallel the
fall in the consumption{income ratio in the 1960s, and the dramatic increase in the data since
the early 1980s. Moreover, the model anticipates the decline in the consumption-to-income ratio
that started in the data after 2004, although the model-based series decline at a much faster
rate than it is apparent in the data.
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Figure 3 panel (b) shows the model-based and actual pre-tax rate of return to capital. The
model-based series track the data well. While these `visual checks' does not constitute a formal
test, the trends in Figures 3 make a strong case for the signi¯cance of medium- to long-run swings
in the productivity growth rate as the key determinant of the joint behavior of the consumption{
income ratio and the rate of return to capital. At a more fundamental level, the results suggest
that the key propagation mechanisms underlying the model, namely capital accumulation and
elasticity of intertemporal substitution, have had an economically signi¯cant impact on the U.S.
saving rate, and I discuss these channels next.
15In interpreting these results two additional issues should be kept in mind: (i) the model-based series are highly
sensitive to the initial values of the capital{output ratio, and (ii) there may still remain a conceptual discrepancy
between the model-based consumption and income series and the data published in the NIPA.
94.1 Productivity growth and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
In this section, I take stock and present an economic explanation of the medium-run swings in
the consumption{income ratio. In the model, this ratio is dictated by two structural factors:
the medium-run growth rate of the labor augmenting technological progress and the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution. The former determines the intertemporal tradeo®s, as manifested
in the rate of return to capital, and the latter determines the degree to which the saving rate
will respond to these tradeo®s.
It is particularly informative to study these channels through the lenses of productivity growth
episodes. The vast literature on the measurement of productivity in the U.S. has pointed to
several distinct episodes since the 1950s: 1952{1973 (Golden Age of productivity growth), 1973{
1995 (productivity slowdown), and 1995{2006 (productivity resurgence).
16 Consider ¯rst the
period from 1952 to 1973. During the Golden Age, the productivity growth rate was relatively
high. In the model, high (but transitory) productivity growth stimulates investment, and thus
leads to a relatively low consumption{income ratio. The corresponding combination of low
consumption{income ratio and high rate of return to capital in actual data is evident in Figure 3.
Against this backdrop of an incentive to save, however, there were countervailing incentives to
reduce the saving rate during the Golden Age (1952{1973). Note that the consumption{income
ratio declines, albeit mildly, during the 1960s. There is a corresponding, but admittedly more
pronounced, decline in the model-based series. This is in part due to the fact that throughout
the 1950s, consumption was possibly below its steady-state level, still recovering from war time
measures. The intertemporal substitution motive anticipates this relatively higher consumption{
income ratio, at least in the ¯rst decade of the sample.
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The arrival of productivity slowdown from 1973 to 1995 reverses the economic incentives to
save and invest: marginal product of capital declines, and investment falls. Despite relatively low
income growth, however, the intertemporal substitution motive leads to sustained consumption
growth. With this emerges a period of rising consumption{income ratio. The model thus tracks
the rise in the actual consumption{income ratio and the fall in the rate of return to capital in
Figure 3.
Productivity resurgence after 1995 initiates a new wave of rising consumption{income ratio.
In the model, higher productivity growth leads to higher rates of investment, and a gradual rise
16See Gordon (2004), and Joregenson, Hu, and Stiroh (2008), and the references cited therein.
17Put di®erently, a higher elasticity of intertemporal substitution would have lead to a reduction in the
consumption{income ratio at the beginning of the sample period.
10in the consumption{income ratio|\gradual," because the growth rate of productivity has not
been uniform from 1995 to 2006, and, on average, has not been as vigorous as the Golden Age.
It is, thus, notable that the model-based series do not capture the consumption boom from 1995
to 2000.
4.2 Future of the consumption{income ratio
What is the baseline model's forecast about the future of the consumption{income ratio in the
U.S.? The answer to this question depends on history for the simple reason that contemporary
capital stock is the initial condition for this thought experiment. At the same time, and as it
will become clear, the factors that determine the future of the consumption-income ratio have
an impact on our interpretation of the past. To chart the future of the U.S. saving rate, I modify
the basic setup in two dimensions: I use forecasts of (i) population, and (ii) labor-augmenting
productivity factor growth rates from 2007 to 2050. Population forecasts span from 2006 to
2050, and are from U.S. Census Bureau (2004). For productivity forecasts, following Jorgenson
et al. (2008), I consider three scenarios for labor-augmenting productivity factor growth rate,
gm, based on their total factor productivity growth rate scenarios: In the \pessimistic" case
gm = 1.0070, in the \baseline" case it is 1.0113, and in the \optimistic" case it is 1.0132.
18
Figure 4 shows the forecasts of consumption{income ratio in the U.S. under alternative pro-
ductivity growth scenarios. While there is considerable uncertainty regarding the precise value
of this ratio, all the scenarios point to a high (about 67%) and stable consumption{income ratio
in the future. While this model-based forecast is above the average consumption{income ratio
from 1952 to 1980, it is still below that of the actual consumption{income ratio as of 2007.
Figure 4 also raises two important issues. First, it demonstrates the material impact of pro-
ductivity forecasts on the entire path of the consumption{income ratio. Indeed, di®erent fore-
casts about productivity growth imply di®erent paths for the consumption{income ratio|even
though in-sample (1952{2006) productivity growth rates are identical under all three scenarios.
In other words, statements about a \low" or \high" saving rate are inseparable from forecasts
of future productivity growth paths: An \optimistic" forecast of productivity growth rate tends
to imply on average a lower consumption{income ratio, both in and out of sample.
Second, a related issue that emerges from Figure 4 is the possibility of using real-time forecasts
of productivity growth throughout the entire sample period, and not just at the end of the sample
period. This issue is particularly relevant if surprise shifts in the medium-run productivity
18Their forecasts span from 2007 to 2016, but I use them as indicative of long-term forecasts until 2050.
11Figure 4: Forecasts of consumption{income ratio
Notes: Consumption is personal consumption expenditures minus gross housing value added. Income is GDP
minus gross housing value added. See Appendix B for data sources and parameter values underlying the model-
based series. Model-based series are computed using a forward-iteration algorithm as explained in Appendix A.2.
The steady-state value of hm is set equal to its sample average. Out-of-sample values of ±m; and ¿k are set equal
to their sample (1952{2006) averages, and gm; and n are forecasts by Jorgenson, Hu, and Stiroh (2008), and U.S.
Bureau of Census (2004), respectively. \Pessimistic," \baseline" and \optimistic" correspond to Jorgenson et al.'s
forecast of productivity growth under alternative scenarios.
growth rate lead to a wedge between actual and forecasted (or perceived) productivity growth
series. In the next section, I provide evidence on the signi¯cance of these forecasts for the
model-based consumption{income ratio.
4.3 Real-time forecasts of productivity growth
The estimates of productivity growth rate based on a speci¯c economic model and information
available to us today indicate several distinct episodes. For interpreting the data, however, it
is important to ascertain whether agents in real time had similar perceptions and were able to
anticipate these turning points in the long-run productivity growth rate between these episodes.
In a recent study, Edge, Laucbach, and Williams (2007) argue that these turning points were,
by and large, unanticipated and, more importantly, perceived as long-term shifts only after a
12signi¯cant time lag.
19
The real-time long-run productivity growth forecasts may di®er from the actual estimates
of productivity growth based on the revised estimates published by statistical agencies or
economists (revised data, for short) for a variety of reasons. One possibility is that percep-
tions of productivity growth might be di®erent from those used by statistical agencies or those
based on economic models. Or, information available to forecasters in real time may be noisier.
Whatever the ultimate drivers of these di®erences, the productivity growth rates based on real-
time and revised data are signi¯cantly di®erent. I thus explore whether simulating the baseline
model using real time, instead of revised productivity growth rates makes material di®erence
for the consumption{income ratio, and use the real-time Kalman ¯lter estimates of Edge et al.
(2007).
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Figure 5 shows the simulation results using the real-time and revised total factor productiv-
ity growth data.
21 I introduce the forecasted values of long-run productivity growth into the
analysis in two ways. The results based on \real-time" estimates use the entire time path of the
Kalman ¯lter estimates. The results based on \forecast" use the forecasted values of produc-
tivity growth rate up to a given year, assume that the latest available forecast represents the
long-run productivity growth rate henceforth, and updates these forecasts dynamically.
22
These simulation results in Figure 5 are signi¯cant in several ways. First, consider the ratio of
consumption to income from 1952 to 2050 in panel (a). The real-time based consumption{income
ratio tends to be less volatile than the revised series. This is due to the fact that, compared to
the revised series, Kalman-¯lter estimates of productivity growth have much less high-frequency
variability. Also, the real-time TFP data imply signi¯cantly lower consumption{income ratio
compared to revised TFP data, and much of this is driven by the lagged recognition of the
productivity resurgence in the 1990s by the forecast data. This, however, imparts a relatively
larger capital{output ratio to the real-time TFP based series. Consequently, while both revised
19We may be faced with a similar swing at the time of this writing: productivity growth rate has slowed down
in recent years, and, there is no consensus among scholars and professional forecasters regarding the viability of
the recent productivity resurgence (the \optimistic" scenario in section 4.2).
20Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) also forecast long-run productivity growth. However, their published
forecasts start in 1969 and are not available for a number of years. Edge et al.'s (2007) estimates start in 1965
and end in 2005, and are consistent with the CEA forecasts in those years for which there is data.
21The original real-time data correspond to forecasts of labor productivity growth rate. I converted these
into forecasts of labor-augmenting productivity growth; see appendix B. Kalman-¯lter forecasts start in 1965,
so for 1952{1965 I used the revised TFP data. The forecast for long-term productivity growth underlying the
model-based series is the \baseline" TFP growth forecast of Jorgenson et al. (2008).
22The exercise here is exploratory. Without taking a ¯rm stance on a model of learning or perceptions, there
is no satisfactory way to handle the discrepancy between revised and real-time values of labor productivity.
13Figure 5: Simulation results with real-time and revised productivity data
Notes: Consumption is personal consumption expenditures minus gross housing value added. Income is GDP
minus gross housing value added. See Appendix B for data sources and parameter values underlying the model-
based series. Model-based series are computed using a forward-iteration algorithm as explained in Appendix A.2.
Out-of-sample values of ±m; and ¿k are set equal to their sample (1952{2006) averages, and gm; and n are forecasts
by Jorgenson, Hu, and Stiroh (2008), and U.S. Bureau of Census (2004), respectively. Steady-state value of hm
is set equal to its sample average. Real-time TFP forecasts are Kalman ¯lter estimates in Edge et al. (2007) with
optimal gain parameter 0:11.
and real-time data indicate a decline in the U.S. consumption{income ratio, the fall in the
real-time based data is considerably more gradual.
Figure 5 panel (b) shows the pre-tax rate of return to capital using both revised and real-time
TFP data. There are signi¯cant di®erences between the simulation results based on revised and
real-time data, especially after the early 1980s. Based on the revised TFP data, the rate of
return to capital is fairly stable. Based on the real-time data, however, it falls secularly from
1980 until the end of 1990. In both cases, the rate of return increases rapidly after 2000. In the
case of real-time data, it approaches to its value along the balanced growth path from below,
and in the case of revised data from above.
14In Figure 5 panels (c) and (d), I repeat the same exercise, and this time compare the simulated
consumption{income ratio and rate of return to capital series with the actual data (1952{2006).
In terms of congruity over time in both the levels and the broader trends in each of these
variables, the real-time TFP based model performs better. There are, of course, several instances
of signi¯cant gaps between the actual and the model-based series|the rate of return data in the
1990s being one of them. Overall, then, in the context of consumption-income ratio, the use of
real-time forecasts of productivity growth help bring the model closer to data, and the results
are suggestive of the economically signi¯cant impact of perceived shifts in long-run productivity
growth on the saving rate.
23
4.4 Housing
In recent years, housing wealth has attracted considerable attention in the context of the con-
sumption boom in the U.S.|and elsewhere (Altissimo et al., 2005). The baseline model excludes
this non-negligible fraction of total wealth. One way to incorporate housing into the model, and
the one I pursue, is to embed housing within a non-market production function framework. In
this approach housing stock is exclusively used, in conjunction with hours worked at home, to
produce a non-market good.
This extension leads to a richer and a more parameterized model. (See appendix A for
details.) Figure 6 focuses on the consumption{income ratio and compares the model-based
series from the models with and without housing with the actual data. Modeling choices about
residential housing leads to a signi¯cant improvement in the performance of the model relative
to the baseline. The model-based consumption{income series track the actual data very closely,
especially from about 1970 until 2000. This suggests that modeling home production in general,
and housing in particular has an economically signi¯cant impact on the interpretation of the
saving rate in the U.S.
24
At the same time, the model with housing has two principle quantitative shortcomings. First,
it yields a much higher consumption-income ratio at the beginning of the sample period|and
much more so than the baseline model. Second, the model shows a marked decline in the
consumption{income ratio, at least since 2000. Note that this is roughly the beginning of
23I also computed the model with labor income taxes, and not surprisingly the results are very similar to those
reported above (see Figure 6 below).
24I also considered durable goods as an input to home production. The results, which are available from
the author, suggest that accounting for durable goods does not have signi¯cant impact on the model-based
consumption-to-income ratio.
15Figure 6: Consumption{income ratio with and without housing
Notes: Consumption is personal consumption expenditures minus gross housing value added. Income is GDP
minus gross housing value added. See Appendix B for data sources and parameter values underlying the model-
based series. Model-based series are computed using a forward-iteration algorithm as explained in Appendix A.2.
Out-of-sample values of ±m;¿k and ¿` are set equal to their sample (1952{2006) averages, and gm; and n are
forecasts by Jorgenson, Hu, and Stiroh (2008), and U.S. Bureau of Census (2004), respectively. Steady-state value
of hm is set equal to its sample average.
the run-up in housing prices in the United States, as well as relatively large current account
de¯cits.
25 I conjecture that the model cannot account for these massive capital gains in the
housing sector, and growing global imbalances, and thus indicates a sharper reduction in the
consumption-to-income ratio, in tandem with a slowdown in productivity growth.
26
25In this context, the closed economy model performs very well before the rise in U.S. net foreign asset liabilities.
In a set of complementary papers, Ghironi et al. (2008), and Chen et al. (2008) analyze the contribution of
di®erential productivity growth in the United States and abroad to changes in international investment position
of the United States. They do not however consider home production, and the di®erences between forecasted
versus actual productivity growth rates.
26One key assumption underlying the quantitative results in this section is that labor augmenting technology
in the market and in the non-market sectors are identical. Non-market sector output is not measured, so there
is no established procedure to estimate the growth rate of productivity in this sector. Given the uncertainty
surrounding the non-market productivity growth ¯gures, these results should be viewed as suggestive. For this
reason, I do not compute the model-based consumption-income ratio using real-time forecasts.
165 Concluding remarks
The general equilibrium analysis I presented in this paper relies on a highly compact (and styl-
ized) modeling approach. It emphasizes an empirical strategy that maps model-based variables
to their empirical counterparts. In fact, throughout much of the analysis, I focused on rela-
tively narrow concepts of market consumption and income, and particularly on those to which
the model can speak. The baseline model matches the broader medium-run variations in the
consumption{income ratio and rate of return to capital in the United States quite well, but it
is still not completely satisfactory. The extended model with housing leads to a better match
between the actual and model-based series. However, this model also fails to account for the
persistent and relatively higher consumption-income ratio at the end of the period of analysis.
There is another message of this analysis: the economy-wide productivity growth rate in
the United States exhibited substantial medium-run swings since the post war, and these had
economically signi¯cant impact on the observed saving rate. Building on the recent research,
I argued that real time forecasts of medium-run productivity growth provide a better under-
standing of the actual data. In this context, building models with learning as a way to study
aggregate saving rates strike me as a promising avenue to pursue, and is left for future research.
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In this appendix, section A.1 presents the general model with non-market production. Sec-
tion A.2 discusses the solution algorithm. Section A.3.1 presents in detail the baseline model
discussed in sections 3. Finally, section A.3.2 presents the extended model with housing dis-
cussed in section 4.4.
A.1 The model economy
Households.| There is a representative household whose size N grows at a gross rate nt =
Nt=Nt¡1. (N should be thought of as the civilian non-institutional population ages 16 and over.)
Total market and non-market time available to each member of the household is normalized to
one. Each member of this household derives utility from consuming market goods, cmt, and
home goods cht, and disutility from working either in the market, hmt, or at home, hht. The




where 0 < ¯ < 1 is the discount factor, and C is a homogenous of degree one consumption
aggregator. The government provides services, gt, but the level of these services is not a decision
variable.
Home production uses housing capital, Kht, as well as home hours according to
cht = H(kht;Ahthht); (A.2)
where Aht is the exogenous labor-augmenting technology in the home sector. H is homogenous
of degree one, so kht = Kht=Nt is per capita durable goods stocks.
There is also capital stock used in market production, kmt. The home and market capital
stocks evolve according to
nt+1kht+1 = (1 ¡ ±ht)kt + xdt; (A.3a)
nt+1kmt+1 = (1 ¡ ±mt)kt + xmt: (A.3b)
where the depreciation rates are denoted by ±, and investment levels are by x.
The rental rate on market capital is r, and the wage rate is w per unit of market hours.
Both are determined in competitive factor markets. These earnings are taxed at ¿kt and ¿`t,
respectively.27 There are also transfers (or lump-sum taxes) from the government ¿t. The per
capita household budget constraint is
cmt + xht + xmt = (1 ¡ ¿`t)wthmt + (1 ¡ ¿kt)rtkmt + ¿t: (A.4)
27The tax rate on capital is calculated as the ratio of capital income tax to before tax pro¯ts plus capital
consumption allowance. Thus, after-tax real interest rate is (1 ¡ ¿kt)f
0(km) ¡ ±m.
20Firms.| Firms operating in competitive product markets use a constant-returns-to-scale pro-
duction function F
ymt = F(kmt;Amthmt); (A.5)
where Amt is the exogenous labor-augmenting technology in the market sector.









Equilibrium conditions.| The market-clearing and ¯rst-order conditions are
hht + hmt + h`t = 1; (A.7a)
cht = H(kht;kht;Ahthht); (A.7b)
cmt + xht + xht + xmt = (1 ¡ ¿`t)wthmt + (1 ¡ ¿kt)rtkmt + ¿t; (A.7c)
(1 ¡ ¿`t)Fh(t)Uc(t)Cm(t) + Uhm(t) = 0; (A.7d)
Hh(t)Uc(t)Ch(t) + Uhh(t) = 0; (A.7e)
Uc(t)Cm(t) = ¯ Uc(t + 1)Cm(t + 1)[(1 ¡ ¿kt+1)Fk(t + 1) + 1 ¡ ±mt+1]; (A.7f)
Uc(t)Cm(t) = ¯ Uc(t + 1)
£
Ch(t + 1)Hkd(t + 1) + (1 ¡ ±ht+1)Cm(t + 1)
¤
: (A.7g)
Total time is normalized to 1, and h` is leisure. The ¯rst three conditions state the equality
of supply and demand in labor and goods markets, followed by two intra-temporal optimality
conditions for consumption{leisure choice. The last two conditions are the intra-temporal opti-
mality conditions for consumption growth based on real rates of return to two types of physical
capital: in each of these equations, the left-hand side is the utility loss of additional saving in
time period t, and the right-hand side is the utility gain in period t + 1 arising from investing
that additional saving in any one type of capital. In the above expressions, subscripts after
U;C;F; and H denote the partial derivatives. These, together with the capital accumulation
equations and the government budget constraint
¿ktrtkmt + ¿`twthmt = gt + ¿t; (A.8)
where g is government consumption expenditures per person, determine the equilibrium in this
model. In the above set of equations
1. the control and endogenous state variables (unknowns) are cmt;cht; xht;xmt;hht;hmt;
kht+1; and kmt+1,
2. the exogenous variables are nt;±ht;±mt;¿`t;¿kt;ght; and gmt,and
3. the initial conditions are N0; kh0; km0; Ah0 and Am0.
21A.2 The computational algorithm
I use a forward-iteration algorithm to numerically solve several parameterized versions of this
problem. Heer and Mau¼ner (2005) provide a clear exposition of this approach.
A.3 Parametrization
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kmt
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A.3.1 The baseline model
The baseline model incorporates the government spending, taxation decisions, and variable labor
supply, but excludes home production.





; ¾ 6= 1; (A.10)
where ¾ > 0 is the inverse of the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution. When ¾ = 1, the
utility function is
U(cmt;hmt) = lncmt + ! ln(1 ¡ hmt): (A.11)
The (market) production function is Cobb-Douglas
F(kmt;Amthmt) = k®
mt (Amthmt)
1¡® ; 0 < ® < 1: (A.12)














(1 ¡ ¿kt+1)®~ k®¡1
mt+1h1¡®
mt+1 + 1 ¡ ±mt+1
i
; (A.13a)
nt+1 gmt+1 ~ kmt+1 = ~ k®
mth1¡®
mt ¡ ~ gt + (1 ¡ ±mt)~ kmt ¡ ~ cmt; (A.13b)
where the market-hours worked satis¯es the intra-temporal optimality condition
! ~ cmt
1 ¡ hmt
= (1 ¡ ®)~ k®
mth¡®
mt: (A.14)
The steady-state values of four endogenous variables h¤
m; ~ y¤



















































22Following the standard calibration methodology, I set the steady-state values of h¤
m; and ~ y¤
m=~ km
as \targets," and work with the implied values of ¯ and !, thereby maintaining four equations
in four unknowns.
The set of nonlinear equations, whose (unique) solution is also the solution to the original
problem, are





mt+1 ¡ ~ gt+1 + (1 ¡ ±mt+1)~ kmt+1 ¡ nt+2 gmt+2 ~ kmt+2
~ k®
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(1 ¡ ¿kt+1)®~ k®¡1
mt+1h1¡®
mt+1 + 1 ¡ ±mt+1
i
; (A.16a)
0 = ~ k®
mth1¡®
mt ¡ ~ gt + (1 ¡ ±mt)~ kmt ¡ nt+1 gmt+1 ~ kmt+1 ¡
1 ¡ ®
!
(1 ¡ hmt)~ k®
mth¡®
mt; (A.16b)





mt+1 ¡ ~ gt+1 + (1 ¡ ±mt+1)~ kmt+1 ¡ ngm ~ kmt+2
~ k®
mth1¡®










(1 ¡ ¿kt+1)®~ k®¡1
mt+1h1¡®
mt+1 + 1 ¡ ±mt+1
i
; (A.16c)
0 = ~ k®
mth1¡®
mt ¡ ~ gt + (1 ¡ ±mt)~ kmt ¡ nt+1 gmt+1 ~ kmt+1 ¡
1 ¡ ®
!
(1 ¡ hmt)~ k®
mth¡®
mt; (A.16d)
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(1 ¡ ¿k)®~ k®¡1
mt+1h1¡®
mt+1 + 1 ¡ ±m
i
; (A.16e)
0 = ~ k®
mth1¡®
mt ¡ ~ gt + (1 ¡ ±mt)~ kmt ¡ ngm ~ kmt+1 ¡
1 ¡ ®
!
(1 ¡ hmt)~ k®
mth¡®
mt; (A.16f)
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(1 ¡ ¿k)®~ k®¡1
mt+1h1¡®
mt+1 + 1 ¡ ±m
i
; (A.16g)
0 = ~ k®
mth1¡®
mt ¡ ~ g + (1 ¡ ±m)~ kmt ¡ ngm ~ kmt+1 ¡
1 ¡ ®
!
(1 ¡ hmt)~ k®
mth¡®
mt; (A.16h)
for t = T ¡ 1;
0 = ~ k®
mth1¡®
mt ¡ ~ gt + (1 ¡ ±mt)~ kmt ¡ ngm ~ k¤ ¡
1 ¡ ®
!
(1 ¡ hmt)~ k®
mth¡®
mt; (A.16i)
with ~ kmT = ~ k¤
m. Note that ~ km0, and fnt;gmt;±mt; ~ gtg
t0
t=0 are data driven. I solve this nonlinear





numerically with a Newton-Raphson algorithm. And,




Experiment 1.| In this experiment, I modify the basic setup in two dimensions: I use forecasts
of population and labor-augmenting productivity factor growth rates from 2007 to 2050. For
productivity forecasts, following Jorgenson et al. (2008), I consider three scenarios for labor-
augmenting productivity factor growth rate corresponding to their total factor productivity
growth rate scenarios of 0.50, 0.81, and 0.95 (with annual percent growth rates): \Pessimistic"
0.70, \baseline," 1.13, and \optimistic" 1.32|though their forecasts span only until 2016.
Experiment 2.| In this experiment, I modify basic setup as in experiment 1, as well as by using
the entire sample path of the real-time long-run productivity growth forecasts. To this end, I
use the real-time Kalman ¯lter estimates of Edge et al. (2007). Their estimates start in 1965
and end in 2005.
Experiment 3.| Here, I modify experiment 2 by using real-time long-run productivity growth
forecasts in a dynamic fashion, whereby each productivity forecast is considered as a long-run
forecast. These forecasts are updated with the intention of mimicking the behaviour of the
economy by only using the information (for productivity) that was available to the agents in
real time.
Experiment 4.| This experiment augments the model with direct taxes on labor, and is a
straightforward extension of experiment 1.
A.3.2 The extended model with housing
I now include the optimal choice of non-market (\home") goods into the analysis, and con¯ne
my attention to housing as the only capital good in home production.
The parametrization of the model with housing stock only is as follows. The instantaneous
utility function is
U(Ct;hmt;hht) =
[Ct(1 ¡ hmt ¡ hht)!]
1¡¾
1 ¡ ¾
; ¾ 6= 1; (A.17)
where ¾ > 0 is the inverse of the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution. When ¾ = 1, the
utility function is
U(Ct;hmt;hht) = lnCt + ! ln(1 ¡ hmt ¡ hht): (A.18)
The utility function for the combined home and market goods is
C(cmt;cht) = cº
mtc1¡º
ht ; 0 < º < 1: (A.19)
The market sector production function is Cobb-Douglas,
F(kmt;Amthmt) = k®
mt (Amthmt)
1¡® ; 0 < ® < 1: (A.20)




1¡®h ; 0 < ®h < 1: (A.21)
The following two ¯rst-order conditions characterize the optimal allocation of time between
the home and market work:
! ~ cmt
º (1 ¡ hmt ¡ hht)
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The following three ¯rst-order conditions characterize the optimal allocation of saving across
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ht+1 + 1 ¡ ±ht+1
¸
: (A.24b)
In the above expressions, the home and market sectors have identical growth rates of labor-
augmenting technology. As discussed by Gomme and Rupert (2007, pp. 463{464), there are
several direct and indirect methods to impute the growth rate of labor-augmenting technology
in the home sector, but each relies on unveri¯able assumptions. Identical productivity growth
rates also facilitates the analysis technically: when the long-run growth rates of productivity in
the home and market sectors are di®erent, and unless the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution
is unitary (the logarithmic case), the model exhibits a non-balanced growth path; see Ngai and
Pissarides (2007). Clearly, future work should quantitatively examine whether departures from
identical long-run productivity growth rates in home and market sectors have economically
signi¯cant impact on the saving rate.
Finally, there are two market-clearing equations:











mt ¡ ~ gt + (1 ¡ ±mt)~ kmt + (1 ¡ ±ht)~ kht ¡ ~ cmt: (A.25b)
This completes the description of the optimal allocations.







































































































h = ~ y¤
h: (A.26h)




m=~ km; and ~ kh=~ km as \targets," and work with the implied values of ¯;!;º, and ®h
(see Table A.1), thereby maintaining eight equations in eight unknowns.
26Table A.1: Steady-state values of exogenous variables, calibrated parameters, and calibration targets
Mnemonic Value Description and source
¯ 0.9409 Subjective discount rate; calibrated
¾ 2 Inverse of the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution
! 3.3052 Weight on leisure in the instantaneous utility function; calibrated
® 0.283 Share of capital in private market production; Gomme and Rupert (2007,
Table 4 based on NIPA)
®h 0.2881 Share of housing stock in home production; calibrated
º 0.5445 Weight on home goods consumption in the consumer aggregator; calibrated
gm 1.0081 Gross rate of labor augmenting technological change (steady state); Jorgen-
son et al. (2008, Table 2, baseline scenario) and ®
n 1.0068 U.S. Census Bureau (2004, year 2050)
g 0.2059 Share of government spending in output; NIPA
¿k 0.2284 Tax rate on capital income (ad valorem); NIPA
¿` 0.2121 Tax rate on labor income (ad valorem); NIPA
±m 0.0673 Depreciation rate of market capital; NIPA
±h 0.0121 Depreciation rate of housing; NIPA
h
¤
m 0.2364 Share of time spent in market production; BLS
h
¤
h 0.096 Share of time spent in nonmarket production; Aguiar and Hurst (2007, Table
2)
~ km=~ ym 1.4144 Market capital to output ratio; NIPA and BEA
~ kh=~ km 0.9579 Housing stock to market capital ratio; NIPA
Notes: See the data appendix for the description of variables calculated from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA), National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), and Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
27B Data sources for parameters and variables
Income, and consumption
The measure of income in Figure 1 is nominal output from (NIPA Table 1.1.5), and consumption
is nominal personal consumption expenditures (NIPA Table 2.3.5). In section 4, the income
concept is nominal market output,
Ym = nominal output ¡ gross housing value added (NIPA Table 1.3.5);
and the consumption concept is nominal market consumption,
Cm = personal consumption expenditures ¡ gross housing value added:
For government expenditures, G, I use government consumption expenditures and gross invest-
ment (NIPA).
Capital stock
Current-cost net stock of private ¯xed assets and consumer durable goods are from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA, Tables 1.1 and 2.1). Market capital, Km, is the sum of nonresidential
structures, equipment and software. Since the BEA reports ¯xed assets on a year-end basis, in
the quantitative analysis the value of capital stock for year t in the corresponding value in BEA
tables for year t ¡ 1.
Tax rate on capital
I calculate the tax rate on corporate pro¯ts and use it as a measure of the ad valorem tax rate
on ¯xed capital income:
¿k =
taxes on corporate income
corporate pro¯ts before taxes + consumption of ¯xed capital
(B.1)
In calculating ¿k, consumption of ¯xed capital (depreciation) is added to corporate pro¯ts to
determine corporate income. Mendoza et al. (1994) and Poterba (1998) compute corporate
capital income tax rates in a similar way. Their denominator, however, is simply corporate
pro¯ts before taxes with IVA and CCAdj. These di®erences should be kept in mind when
comparing alternative estimates of tax rates and after-tax rates of return on capital.
Corporate pro¯ts before taxes. As in the NIPA, corporate pro¯ts before corporate taxes from
current production is measured as the sum of pro¯ts before taxes, inventory valuation adjust-
ment (IVA), and the capital consumption adjustment (CCAdj). Both the IVA and CCAdj
removes from pro¯ts the capital-gain-like element or the capital-loss-like element that results
from inventory withdrawals and depreciation of ¯xed assets at the prices of earlier periods.
The BEA deducts property taxes paid by corporations from corporate earnings before reporting
corporate pro¯ts before taxes in the NIPA. Source: NIPA Table 1.13.
28Consumption of ¯xed capital. In the NIPA the CCAdj is the di®erence between consumption of
¯xed capital (CFC) and capital consumption allowances. CFC is a charge for the depreciation
of ¯xed capital. The BEA calculates this based on studies of prices of used equipment and
structures in resale markets. Capital consumption allowances consist of tax-return-based depre-
ciation charges for corporations. Thus, the appropriate current-cost based depreciation is CFC
calculated as the sum of corporate CCAdj and corporate sector capital consumption allowance;
see also U.S. Department of Commerce (2002). Sources: NIPA Tables 1.13, and 6.22.
Taxes on corporate income. This consists of taxes on corporate income paid to federal, state,
and local governments, but excludes property taxes levied on corporations. Source: NIPA Table
6.18.
Discussion. There is no straightforward method to calculate the tax rate on capital, so any
imputation of this tax rate involves judgement. The method I outlined above is simple, and
takes a narrow view of capital, both in terms of sector coverage and type of assets: It only covers
the corporate sector and excludes land and other tangible assets. It focuses on the corporate
sector because this introduces fewer assumptions into the analysis. It excludes land for the
purposes of consistency with the BEA's capital stock and depreciation estimates.
There are, of course, alternative methods. Poterba (1998) sums corporate income taxes,
property taxes and investor taxes (taxes on dividends and interest income) to arrive at a compre-
hensive measure of tax burden on corporate earnings (non-¯nancial corporations only). Gomme
and Rupert (2007) calculate the tax rate on capital, ¿k by ¯rst imputing \taxes paid"
taxes paid =¿h (net interest + ®proprioter's income + rental income)
+ taxes on corportate capital
+ state and local property taxes
+ state and local other taxes; (B.2)
where the personal tax rate, ¿h is
¿h =
personal current taxes
wages and salaries + proprietors' income + rental income + asset income
; (B.3)
where `asset income' includes dividend and interest income. To obtain ¿k divide these taxes paid





net operating surplus + capital consumption ¡ (1 ¡ ®)proprietor's income
; (B.4)
where ® is the share of capital in income.
These methods make an allowance for taxes on capital that originate from interest income.
However, the classi¯cation of property taxes entirely as a tax on capital services assumes that
these taxes do not pay for any service that is economically valuable for the corporation. At the
same time, these methods allocate a variety of taxes to capital services by imputing taxes on
rental income, interest income, and share of proprietor's income.
29Rate of return on capital
To maintain consistency with the tax rate on capital, I compute the before tax rate of return
on corporate capital, rk,C, as
rk,C =
corporate pro¯ts before taxes + net interest
corporate ¯xed assets
; (B.5)
where corporate pro¯ts are with IVA and CCAdj.
I compute the model-based before-tax rates of return, r, as
r = ®(~ ym=~ km) ¡ ±m; (B.6)
and compare them with estimated rK,C.
Corporate ¯xed assets. These are current-cost, net stock of private ¯xed assets reported by BEA
in NIPA Table 6.1. Since the BEA reports ¯xed assets on a year-end basis, for corporate capital
stock in year t, I used the corresponding value in the BEA tables for year t ¡ 1.
Discussion. In the literature, it is common to compute after-tax rates of return on capital
and compare them with existing estimates (e.g, those calculated by Poterba (1998)). In our
theoretical model,
model-based after-tax rate of return = (1 ¡ ¿k)®(~ ym=~ km) ¡ ±m: (B.7)
However, these are not immediately comparable with the existing estimates for two reasons.
First, Poterba (1998, Table 1) uses an income measure for calculating the tax rate on capital that





®(~ ym=~ km) ¡ ±m
i
;
where tax rate on corporate income is calculated as
¿net
k =
taxes on corporate income
corporate pro¯ts before taxes
: (B.8)
Second, Poterba's rate of return series are for nonfarm non¯nancial corporate business sector
and he calculates the return on all tangible assets, including structures, equipment software,
land and inventories. The BEA estimates ¯xed assets (structures, equipment and software)
at current (replacement) cost, whereas nonfarm non¯nancial corporate business sector tangible
assets are measured at market value, historical cost, and replacement cost. To calculate the rate
of return, I use (i) BEA's ¯xed assets because the model does not have land or inventories, and
(ii) corporate ¯xed assets because the capital stock in the model does not distinguish between
¯nancial and non¯nancial ¯rms. In fact, at the end of the sample, in the nonfarm non¯nancial
corporate business sector the ratio ¯xed assets (from BEA) to tangible assets (from FFA at
market cost) has been signi¯cantly below 0.8, which largely accounts for the rate of return
di®erentials reported in this paper and those reported in Poterba (1998, Table 1 column 1).
30Tax rate on labor income
After-tax labor income. This is labor income minus labor taxes. I compute labor income, Y L,
as (all line references below are to NIPA Table 2.1):
labor income = wages and salaries (line 3)
+ personal current transfer receipts (line 16)
¡ personal contributions for government social insurance (line 24); (B.9)
and labor taxes, ¿l, as:
labor taxes = personal current taxes (line 25) £ share of labor taxes (B.10)
where
share of labor taxes =
wages and salaries
wages and salaries + nonwage income
; (B.11)
where
nonwage income = proprietors' income (line 9) + rental income (line 12)
+ interest income (line 14) + dividend income (line 15): (B.12)
Individual and payroll tax on labor income. I use individual and payroll tax rate on labor income
as a measure of tax rate on labor income, ¿`:
¿` =
¿h £ wages and salaries + contributions for social insurance
wages and salaries + employer contributions for social insurance
; (B.13)
where the personal tax rate, ¿h in equation (B.3).
Discount factor
In several cases, I calibrate the subjective discount factor using an estimate of the real interest
rate. Speci¯cally, in examples 1 and 2, I use an annualized discount rate of 6.5%, which cor-
responds to ¯ = 0:939. (I use a common discount rate for illustrative purposes: as identical
balanced growth restrictions imply di®erent discount rates in models with and without capital
income taxes.)
A common alternative is to use the restrictions implied by the balanced growth path. Specif-












and it is common practice to calibrate the subjective discount rate by using parameter values
on gm;±m;¿k;®, as well as the so-called \calibration target" output-capital ratio, ~ y¤
m=~ k¤
m. In
general, it is not straightforward to choose the output-capital ratio. For instance, Chen et al.
(2007) simply set it equal to two for Japan, and do not discuss this choice further. Gomme and
Rupert (2007) link it to sample average of the investment-output ratio, which implicitly assumes
that the throughout the sample period all variables of interest exhibit only transitory deviations
from their balanced growth paths.
31Elasticity of inter-temporal substitution
In the model 1=¾ corresponds to the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. In the simulations,
I set ¾ = 2 (a \low" elasticity) and also discuss the sensitivity of the results to ¾ = 1.
Share of capital
The share of capital is the elasticity of market output with respect to capital, and is the sum of
share of structures, equipment and software in market value added: ® = 0:283. Source: Gomme
and Rupert (2007, Table 4).
Depreciation rate
I calculated the implied depreciation rate on private nonresidential ¯xed assets (equipment,
software and structures), ±m, as follows: Current-cost depreciation divided by end-of-period
current-cost net stock of assets. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (Private Fixed Assets by
Type, Tables 2.1 and 2.4).
Growth rate of technology
1952{2006 (revised data). To determine the growth rate of labor augmenting productivity factor
in the market sector, gm, I use the estimates of multi-factor productivity (MFP) in the private
business sector, excluding government enterprises (Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) series ID:
MPU740023 (K)), and calculate the gross growth rate as
gmt = (MFPt=MFPt¡1)1=(1¡®); (B.15)
where ® is the elasticity of capital with respect to output. These estimates are based on the
recent revised data, and as such, might have di®erent from productivity growth forecasts using
real-time data.
1965{2006 (real-time data). Edge et al. (2007, Table 1) compute estimates of long-run labor
productivity growth rate in the nonfarm business sector using Kalman ¯lter and real-time data
from 1965 to 2005. To compute the real-time labor augmenting productivity growth rate, I
¯rst subtract the contributions of capital deepening and labor quality from labor productivity
to convert these into estimates total factor productivity growth rate. The forecasts of capital
deepening and labor quality are not available, and I use the estimates|based on revised data|
reported in Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2008, Table 1).28
Since 1969 the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) in the Economic Report of the President
have annually been publishing their forecasts of long-run (6 year horizon) labor productivity
growth in the nonfarm business sector. I also used the CEA's forecasts, and found that the
results are indistinguishable from those of Kalman ¯lter estimates of Edge et al. (2007). Since
the CEA and Edge et al. (2007) estimates do not cover identical years, I (arbitrarily) impute
28The Congressional Budget O±ce's (CBO) The Budget and Economic Outlook annually publishes separate
forecasts of labor and total factor productivity in the nonfarm business sector. However, these estimates are not
available before 1996.
32missing values to span the same time period. The CEA forecasts started in 1969 and did not
report forecasts in 1972, 1973, 1975, 1976, 1981, and 1982, so I use the Edge et al. real-time
Kalman ¯lter estimates corresponding to those \missing" years. Edge et al. estimates end in
2005, so I use the CEA forecast for 2006.
2006{2016 (forecast). I use the private nonfarm business sector total factor productivity growth
rate projections by Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2008, Table 2) and convert them into gross
growth rate of labor augmenting productivity factor as above. Their \pessimistic" case is 0.50
percent per year, \base" case is 0.81 percent, and \optimistic" case is 0.95 percent.29
Population
1952{2006. I calculate the growth rate of population, n = Nt=Nt¡1 based on the civilian
noninstitutional population, ages 16 years and over (BLS, series ID: LNU00000000).
2007{2050 (forecast). Population projections for ages 16 years and over are from U.S. Census
Bureau (2004) These projections are very similar to the United Nations's (2006) population
projections based on constant fertility assumption.
Hours worked
Market hours. I constructed hm as the ratio of hours worked to total discretionary hours:
hm =
weekly market hours worked per person
total discretionary hours per week per person
; (B.16)
where
weekly market hours worked per person
= average weekly hours £ market employment rate; (B.17)
and




Sources: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and accessed through FRED
(Federal Reserve Economic Data) Link: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2, Economic Research
Division Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (series IDs in parentheses). Average weekly hours
is for total private industries (AWHNONAG). These series start in 1964, so I constructed the
series for 1952{1963 scaling the average weekly hours, manufacturing (AWHMAN) by the ratio
of manufacturing hours to total private industries hours in 1964. (Over the balance of the
sample series this ratio increases secularly.) These data are monthly and seasonally adjusted.
Civilian employment (CE16OV) is monthly, seasonally adjusted, and includes persons 16 years
29The CBO's estimates of total factor productivity in the nonfarm business sector do not control for labor
quality so I do not use them as they are not comparable with the BLS and Jorgenson et al. estimates.
33of age and older. Civilian noninstitutional population (CNP16OV) is monthly, not seasonally
adjusted and includes persons 16 years of age and older. Total discretionary hours per week is
90, de¯ned as total hours within a week (168 hours) minus hours for eating, sleeping, personal
activities, such as hygiene, and shopping (78 hours, discussed below). Annual values are the
monthly averages of hm given in equation (B.16). This de¯nition of market hours corresponds
to the \core market work" in Aguiar and Hurst (2007). Sample average of hm is 0.236, which is
slightly less than the corresponding value of 0.255 reported by Gomme and Rupert (2007, Table
5) based on the American Time-Use Survey, 2003.
Home hours. There are signi¯cant conceptual di±culties associated with determining hours
spent in home production (nonmarket work hours). I associate home production with cooking,
cleaning, indoor painting, and other household chores done inside the house. I include child
care and gardening in the residual category \leisure." Each of these classi¯cations is subjective.
An additional complication is that there are no estimates of nonmarket hours work based on
nationally representative surveys prior to 1965. The American Time-Use Survey, available for
1965, 1975, 1985, 1993, and 2003, provide the most detailed window on nonmarket hours. In the
absence of annual data spanning 1952{2006, I used 1965 values for years 1952{1964, and 2003
values for 2004 and beyond. Table B.1 shows the existing estimates, based on Aguiar and Hurst
(2007), for average weekly hours spent in (core) nonmarket work. There is a secular decline in
the hours spent in nonmarket work.30
30The average hours of work spent in market and nonmarket work reported in Table B.1 are for a nationally
representative sample of individuals aged between 21 and 65. As such, Aguiar and Hurst's sample excludes
individuals 16 through 20 years of age, and 66 and over, which are included in the population measure I use
in this study. Using Aguiar and Hurst's average hours per week spent in nonmarket work as a fraction of total
discretionary hours per week is thus problematic to the extent that the individuals excluded from their sample
have a di®erent time allocation for nonmarket work. The advantage, on the other hand, of their approach is
that their data on hours worked control for demographic changes that have taken place over time. Since such
demographic considerations are absent in the model here, their estimates are appropriate in our context. Aguiar
and Hurst also report average time spent in market work, but since their sample excludes those who are more
likely to be nonemployed, their numbers for hm are not suitable for my purposes.
34Table B.1: Nonmarket hours of work from American Time-Use Surveys
Time-use category 1965 1975 1985 1993 2003
Average hours per week spent in
core nonmarket work 13.02 11.34 10.82 8.75 8.66
nondiscretionary hours 77.64 78.78 78.88 77.77 77.59
As a fraction of total discretionary hours per week
Core nonmarket work 0.145 0.126 0.120 0.097 0.096
Source: Aguiar and Hurst (2007, Tables 2 and 9); full sample.
Notes: Total discretionary hours is 90, and de¯ned as total hours within a week (168 hours) minus nondiscretionary
hours, including eating, sleeping, personal activities and shopping (78 hours). Nondiscretionary hours is computed
as Aguiar and Hurst's Leisure 1 measure minus their Leisure 2 measure plus time spent in obtaining goods and
services/shopping. Core nonmarket work includes food preparation, food presentation, kitchen/food cleanup,
washing/drying clothes, ironing, dusting, vacuuming, indoor cleaning, indoor painting, etc. Aguiar and Hurst's
full sample covers individuals aged between 21 and 65, and averages for each year control for demographic changes
from 1965 to 2003.
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